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Abstract
This paper will attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to the complex issue of 
development in sub-Saharan Africa by identifying an FDI reliance-rejection paradox 
emanating from the incompatibility between colonial legacies and Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. Since the 1980s, international financial institutions have 
imposed foreign direct investment as the main source to finance the development of 
SSA, while ignoring the two main structural issues inherited from colonialism - the 
organisation of the labour market and the dependence on natural resources extraction. 
The former drastically reduces the attractiveness of the SSA economy to investors, 
while the latter forces FDIs to be exclusively oriented towards resource exports. The 
implication of this is the formation of three vicious cycles - economic instability, the 
Dutch disease and patronage - which locked the continent in an FDI paradox that 
prevents it from funding its own development.
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Development in sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the most disputed issues among 
development institutions and their detractors in the last thirty years. While the rest of 
the world has experienced a relatively uninterrupted growth since 1960, SSA hasn’t 
been able to follow this trend, and its importance in the world economy has 
persistently diminished - constituting 17% of world GDP per capita between 1960 and 
1969 with a higher growth rate than East Asia, but only 9.9% between 2000 and 2008 
(World Bank, 2009). In absolute terms, SSA’s level of development has been declining 
in most countries, with 384.2 million people living with less than US$1.25 a day in 
2005, compared to 202.1 million in 1981 (Chen & Ravallion, 2008). 
This paper will argue that it is the incompatibility between colonial legacies and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), implemented since the 1980s by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), that has hindered development in SSA in the 
last three decades. Indeed, SAPs have created a system relying on Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs) as the main source to finance the development of SSA. However, 
the structure of the African labour market and the resource-extraction tradition, both 
inherited from colonialism, respectively make SSA very unattractive for investors, and 
direct the few inward FDIs towards the resource-export sector. This focus on natural 
resources led to the formation of three vicious cycles - enclave economy, economic 
volatility and patronage - which trapped SSA in an FDI reliance-rejection paradox, 
leaving the continent with no possibility to finance its own development.
Although the conclusions reached by this paper will intend to respond to the broader 
sub-Saharan challenge, the specific cases of Zambia and Tanzania will be used to 
illustrate the argument - two neighbouring countries which had comparable colonial 
and post-colonial experiences that shaped their institutions in similar ways (van der 
Geest & Wignaraja, 1996).
Indeed, obtaining their independence in the early 1960s, both Zambia and Tanzania 
followed an import-substitution strategy aimed at providing ‘self-reliance’ and 
stability, as claimed by President Nyerere in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 (Nyerere, 
1973). However, an unfortunate combination of events in the 1970s led to a sharp 
increase in both countries’ public debts (Kapunda, 2005) : the 1973 oil crisis 
coincided with the fall in the price of copper for Zambia (which represented 95% of 
its export earnings), and a major domestic food shortage and international increase in 
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food prices for Tanzania (Raikes & Gibbon, 1996). Strong pressures from IFIs led to 
the implementation of a series of SAPs since the mid-1980s which reshaped Zambian 
and Tanzanian economic systems, placing FDIs as the key to development. 
Indeed, there are four ways for an economy to finance its development, as represented 
in Figure 1. However, domestic saving is almost non-existent in SSA, as the marginal 
propensity to consume is close to 1 at such stage of development, and foreign aid 
remains irregular and disorganised (Sundaram, 2011). Therefore, as the other main 
source of financing, public taxation and borrowing, was drastically restricted by SAPs 
to reduce public deficits through retrenchments in the public sector and privatisations, 
FDIs became the prerequisite to development (Tambwe, 1997). They were indeed 
seen as a ‘‘more reliable source of financing’’, capable of driving progress and 
providing ‘‘access [to] superior technology’’ (Sundaram, 2011 : 8). However, SAPs 
were implemented while ignoring the two main structural characteristics of SSA, both 
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Source : Adapted from OECDAfDB (2010) by Sundaram, 2011
Figure 1
Despite the fact that it is rarely recognised by economists, the structure of the labour 
market is the main cause of the unattractiveness of the sub-Saharan economy for 
investors.
The foundations of the current SSA labour market were established during colonial 
times, through the introduction of a formal wage labour market. In Zambia, British 
settlers decided to progressively reform the urban informal market by creating wage 
jobs in key towns, which initiated a phenomenon of strong migration from rural to 
urban areas (Taylor, 2009 ; Sundaram, 2011). However, the urban population 
increased at a higher rate than urban job creation, and most migrants ended up 
working in the informal urban market. The formal market was hence unable to replace 
the informal one, and both had to develop next to each other (ibid.).
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SSA inherited a labour market characterised by a strong division between formal and 
informal markets which was further exacerbated by the introduction of SAPs in the 
1980s (Tørres, 1998). Indeed, the reduction of the public sector, one of the main 
policies suggested by IFIs to lower public deficit, implied large retrenchment 
programmes which were supposed to be compensated by job creation in the private 
sector through privatisations. For instance, only between 1994 and 1995, 47,000 jobs 
were eliminated in Tanzania under the Civil Service Reform Programme (van der 
Geest & Wignaraja, 1996). However, the ‘unknown’ in this equation was the extent of 
job creation in the private sector in response to privatisations, which turned out to be 
lower than job destruction in the public sector. This growing inability of the formal 
sector to provide employment to the population led to a constant growth of the 
informal sector, which constituted 25% of the SSA economy in the 1990s - 50% if the 
agricultural sector is considered (Gilbert, 1998). This has serious implications for 
foreign investment, as FDIs are only made in the formal market : from the perspective 
of investors, the sub-Saharan economy is 25 to 50% smaller than it actually is.
Furthermore, the SSA labour force inherited from colonialism lacks comparative 
advantages, as it is a very unskilled, unproductive and costly one (Taylor, 2009). The 
really poor health conditions shape the age composition of the population by 
drastically lowering its life expectancy. Hence, an important part of the labour force is 
formed of young people who start working at earlier ages instead of completing their 
education. In Zambia for instance, 53% of children enrolled in schools do not finish 
the primary cycle, while 75% of Tanzanian children do not enrol in secondary school 
(UNICEF, 2011). This resulted in a very unskilled labour force unable to respond to 
potential foreign investments that often require higher levels of expertise. Moreover, 
the restricted supply of skilled workers increases the costs of production, together with 
the high level of labour protection, which makes sub-Saharan labour force the least 
cost-effective in the world (Taylor, 2009).
As a consequence of this, the structure of the SSA labour market has kept investors 
away, who prefer approaching cheaper and more productive developing economies. In 
fact, since 1970, investors have never showed any significant interest in SSA, which 
attracted only 3% of world FDI in 2000-2008, and even less in 1990-1999 (figure 2). 
Hence, SAPs placed FDIs as the key to the development of an economy which was 
structurally incompatible with FDIs themselves.
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Source : UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009 ; Sundaram, 2011.
Figure 2
The trouble with SSA inward FDIs does not simply lie in their small quantity, but 
also in their nature. The vast majority of investments are made in the natural resources 
extraction sector, which is extremely damaging for the African economy and 
originates from colonial legacies.
In fact, the main rationale behind colonialism was to exploit natural resources in 
foreign lands, as they were becoming always more scarce and expensive in Europe. 
Thus, resource extraction and export constituted the main activity throughout colonial 
times, and when SSA countries obtained their independence, they were left with no 
other sector of the economy having attained an acceptable level of development 
(Tørres, 1998). Zambia and Tanzania had only been exporting, respectively, ore and 
ingots, and tobacco, sugar, fruits, cotton, sisal and timber, and British settlers left them 
with no infrastructure - which is an essential prerequisite for investment (ibid.). 
Unable to produce what they needed, Zambia and Tanzania became entirely dependent 
on imports and foreign aid. As a consequence of this, import substitution strategies 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s to promote the development of their own 
manufactural and industrial sectors (Nyerere, 1973).
However, when state-led ISIs failed, most manufacturing enterprises closed down and 
IFIs declared that investment would only be made through market allocation (Taylor, 
2009). Since manufacturing and industrial sectors were almost non-existent and SSA 
was lacking basic infrastructure, foreign investors refused to engage their funds in the 
development of new sectors, and hence concentrated their efforts on the only activity 
that had previously been exploited - natural resources extraction.
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Nevertheless, this sector provides extremely limited development opportunities and 
can be very damaging for a developing economy, as it does not provide advantageous 
transfers of technology, and the intrinsic intensity of such activity does not offer 
significant returns to labour - i.e., a more intensive extraction produces very little 
positive outcome for employment (Taylor, 2009 ; Sundaram, 2011). Furthermore, the 
high concentration of FDIs on natural resources led to the formation of a series of 
‘traps’, which locked SSA in an FDI reliance-rejection paradox that hinders its 
development.
First of all, a phenomenon known as enclave economy or ‘Dutch disease’ made its 
appearance on the continent. Natural resources are traded for foreign currency, which 
inflates the national currency and undermines the price-competitiveness of the other - 
still weak - sectors of the economy, whose production falls for both domestic and 
international trade (Collier, 2008). By crowding out key productive sectors such as 
manufacturing and services - which were the source of the East Asian fast 
development - the Dutch disease highly contributes to the stagnation of SSA. As a 
matter of fact, the GDP share of the manufacturing sector has been declining since 
1980 in SSA, reaching 8% in 2000-2008 - 3.75% in Tanzania (ILO, 1995 ; 
UNCTAD). Therefore, the Dutch disease led to the constant relative growth of a 
sector that does not contribute to development on a macro level, while crowding out 
FDIs in  the productive sectors.
Secondly, rents created by resource extraction are extremely volatile, as they entirely 
depend on the fluctuations in world prices. This exacerbated the intensity of the 
business cycle, making SSA economies extremely difficult to manage : trivial and 
unproductive public spending is made during boom times, which are then 
compensated by further retrenchments during recessions (Collier, 2008). Thus, the 
positive growth rates experienced throughout the continent since 2000 can easily be 
linked to the recent boom in commodity prices, including a 300% increase in oil 
prices, while the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the associated decrease in commodity 
prices caused negative growth rates as African rents fell (Sundaram, 2011 ; Taylor, 
2009). Nevertheless, investors are very sensitive to such economic volatility, and 
refuse to invest in the sectors that would make SSA economy more stable - first and 
foremost manufacturing.
Finally, the extraction sector allows the government and political parties to be 
financed to a large extent by the rents that it produces, rather than public taxation 
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(Sachs & Warner, 1995). It becomes easier for them and more cost-effective to run 
their political campaigns through patronage and ethnic loyalties, rather than 
improvements in public services (Collier, 2008). Indeed, as public money emanates to 
a lower extent from the population, they are less likely to be reprimanded. However, 
this often leads to political and ethnic instability, which makes FDIs more risky for 
investors, and hence contributes to SSA’s unattractiveness.
What stems out of this paper is a necessity to tackle SSA’s structural problems, i.e., 
the organisation of its labour market and its exclusive focus on the resource extraction 
sector. It is hence strongly suggested that IFIs and African governments should design 
state-led investment programmes backed up by international aid, aimed at fostering 
education, healthcare, public services, and the private industrial sector. A particular 
focus on the transformation of domestic natural resources into final products and a 
shift to enhanced domestic financing would encourage the creation of more stable 
development opportunities, and would allow SSA to prepare its labour markets and 
industries to global competition.
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